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Abstract. A significant class of agent architectures designed for operation in a
multi-agent world choose their next actions or plans based on a limited anal-
ysis; they ignore considerations of the multi-agent world they inhabit, and the
inter-agent relationship that might influence their choice of action. This paper
addresses that problem, and focuses on the integration of BDI-like agent archi-
tectures with computational notions of norms and dependence to arrive at a com-
putational multi-agent organisation model. We describe initial work in pursuit of
that goal.
1 Introduction
Much research in the field of intelligent agents and multi-agent systems has been con-
cerned with the development of computational agent architectures that are designed to
solve particular problems or offer general agent-based solutions. Progress in this area
has been significant, and there is now a range of architectures to suit a vast array of prob-
lem scenarios. Similarly, at the organisational level, a rich set of abstractions, which
includes such concerns as norms and dependencies, has been identified and studied.
However, these two important and complementary aspects of the field of agent-based
systems sit some distance from each other, without adequate integration, particularly at
the level of computational architecture. In particular, a significant class of agent archi-
tectures that are designed for operation in a multi-agent world choose their next actions
or plans based on a very limited analysis (if any analysis at all) of these organisational
issues. That is to say that although the intention is for multi-agent operation, these
systems ignore considerations of the multi-agent world they inhabit, and the inter-agent
relationship that might legitimately influence their choice of action. We target this prob-
lem, and focus on the integration of BDI-like agent architectures with computational
notions of norms and dependence to arrive at a computational multi-agent organisation
model. In this paper we describe initial work in pursuit of that goal.
In the next sections we present a particular kind of agent based on the BDI model
of agents. Then, we describe important notions of power and dependence, and finally
consider norms before summarising. The key point is that although each section focuses
on different aspects, they are integrated both in the mathematical description and in the
textual explanation, offering a unified account of architecture, power, and norms.
2 An Abstract BDI Agent
Perhaps the most common and most widely cited deliberative agent architecture is the
BDI architecture in its many forms and guises. Based around intuitive folk psychology
notions of belief, desire and intention, BDI has become almost a default architecture,
or a base architecture from which to consider more advanced or more sophisticated as-
pects not addressed in the more simple versions. Our own view is that for these reasons
and for others relating to applicability and generality, BDI is therefore an appropriate
place to start. Yet the different versions of BDI architecture, even those from the same
tradition, (e.g. [2, 13]) all have rather different specific architectural bases. As a means
of building up a general model of power and norms, we start by offering an abstract
BDI architecture, which does not fit with any specific model, but is inspired by previ-
ous work on dMARS [10] and AgentSpeak(L) [11]. It includes the salient features, but
omits irrelevant details. The model itself follows this previous work and consequently
we do not provide an extensive description. In what follows, we use the Z specification
language to construct a formal model of the BDI agents and of inter-agent dependence
and norms. Z is based on set-theory and first order logic, with full details available in
[17]. For reasons of brevity, however, we will not elaborate the use of Z further.
Agent and Agent State In general, a deliberative agent is essentially defined by its
plan library, which contains all the recipes for action the agent knows about, and its
capabilities or specific actions.
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At run-time, an agent will also have a set of events, beliefs, goals and intentions that
are generated in response to the environment through the reasoning and action control
cycle of the agent. These components define the agent acting in the world, and are the
key artifacts that are manipulated to ensure effective behaviour. We consider each in
turn.
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We start, however, by saying nothing about the nature of external actions or beliefs,
which we parachute into our specification as given sets. Effectively, they are primitives
(although beliefs are typically implemented as first-order predicates, and in a more so-
phisticated and detailed analysis we might equally do the same). External actions are
simply those actions that change the state of the world, and beliefs are the representa-
tion of information about the world. The alternative to an external action is an internal
one, which either removes or adds a belief to or from the agent’s set of beliefs. Also
key to many BDI architectures is the notion of an event, which is simply something that
happens in the world that can be perceived, and it is either a goal or a belief. (It may
be a new goal or belief or the removal of a goal or belief.) Finally, goals, which direct
behaviour, and are desirable states to be achieved, are defined as either achieving some
belief (which amounts to making some predicate true in general) or querying a belief
(which amounts to testing if a predicate is true).
K
/L0)G
%ﬂ3	 
,
94.ﬂNM%?<
	9=3O
I%ﬂ!2
%ﬂ3.	 
,
4ﬂP&Q&BRS)TﬁTVU U?@"	9=XW WFYZ
[\4ﬁU U?@
	=NW W
/+"ﬂ!+&Q&R]64A.	^U U
DF4A.	W W_YH"	8=`U U?@"	9=aW W
DF4A.	b&Q&Rdc
eﬃ"%$3U U2?<
	9=XW WfYH
,g

6U U?@"	8=`W W
Agent Plans Now, plans are the most sophisticated data structure in deliberative agents,
and effectively specify the course of action to be taken by the agent in achieving goals.
They consist of several key components. First, the plan body, typically comprising a
sequence of actions, encapsulates the agent’s “know-how”. This is the most important
part of a plan, but we also need to specify the conditions under which a plan can be
initiated or continue, and what happens when a plan fails or succeeds. To start, a plan
requires a triggering event, which is simply an event that causes the plan to fire. Once
this occurs, its applicability to the current situation must be determined through the
context, which is a set of beliefs that are entailed by the current beliefs of the agent.
At this point the plan becomes active (that is, it is relevant and possible). For the plan
to continue, we also need to include the notion of maintenance conditions which must
hold for the plan to be executable. Finally, we need internal actions to specify what
happens when a plan fails or succeeds.
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Now, although the most general type of a plan is a tree, with branches and choice
points, such a structure makes the formal specification of dependencies unnecessarily
complicated in what follows. We therefore specify a body of a plan to be a sequence
of branches, which are either actions or goals, with actions being internal or external.
There is no loss of generality here, as a tree can be considered to be a set of sequence
of branches where each sequence is a possible path from the root to a leaf node.
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Plan Instances A plan instance is an active plan that has been instantiated as either
an addition to an existing intention or as a new intention. This plan instance represents
a copy of the original plan that now serves as a mental attitude directing behaviour
as opposed to a recipe for behaviour. The distinction between plans as recipes and
plans as mental attitudes is very important in the study of deliberative agents and in
this specification we distinguish between calling the former plans and the latter plan
instances. The only distinction we make in our abstract BDI model is that every plan
instance has a status which determines whether the plan instance is currently executing.
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Now, once a goal is selected from those the agent desires, a plan is selected to
achieve that goal; this plan forms the basis of the intention that will direct the future
behaviour of the agent. In short, an intention is a sequence (or stack) of plan instances.
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In order to select a plan as an intention in response to an event, we must first generate
those plans that are relevant (those that are triggered by an event), and then the subset of
these that are applicable with the current beliefs (those whose contexts are a subset of
the current beliefs). The variables, #"	 
ﬂﬃ  	QﬂH- and  , 9  	 ﬂﬃ- associate each event
with the current set of relevant and applicable plans. The executing plans of an agents
are those plan instances that are at the top of each intention stack.
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3 Dependence
The architecture described above is a generalised version of the standard BDI model
that underlies numerous agent systems. It decides on its course of action by identify-
ing relevant and applicable plans to instantiate as intentions for execution. The problem
with this model as it stands is twofold: first, there may be multiple plans in the plan li-
brary that may be both relevant and applicable, and the model says nothing about how to
choose between them; second, the model does not include any consideration of depen-
dencies or other relationship between agents that may impact on the suitability of plans.
In this section, we describe a simplified power model based on the work of Castelfranchi
and others on social power theory and social dependence networks (SDN), that can be
used as a basis for making such judgements between plans.
Agent Models Before we can consider dependence notions we first briefly turn our at-
tention to the models agents must have of each other in order to be socially adequate in
general. In order that agents can take advantage of the capabilities of others, they gener-
ally need models of them; moreover, for agents to investigate the various dependencies
that each agent may have on others, a model of their goals, beliefs and intentions will
also be required. Using the technique from the SMART agent framework [15, 12], agent
models are constructed at this level of abstraction by application of the existing models
for describing deliberative agent architectures.
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In general, agents have a model of every other agent and of themselves.
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Now that we have defined deliberative agents and their models, it is possible to
investigate the notion of dependence between agents.
Action Dependence Castelfranchi and colleagues developed the social power theory
[3, 5], which claims that by comparing the dependence of one agent on others with
their dependence on it, social behaviour results. According to Castelfranchi et al. [5],
an agent depends on another to perform an action useful for achieving one of its goals,
if it is unable to perform the action while the other agent can. Based on this notion we
formalise a more generic relationship among agents in our framework, by first defining
a dependence relationship between agents with respect to an action in terms of the
capabilities of both.
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Then, a dependence relation caused by an action exists if there is a current intention
of the agent which can only be performed by another agent. This means that the action
is included in the instantiated plan that comprises the intention as the executing plan.
Also notice that the analysis is now from the perspective of the planning agent and must
therefore be with respect to the model it has of other agents.
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Plan Dependence As can be seen from the above and in line with the social depen-
dence networks originally proposed by Sichman et al. [16], in general, an agent needs
to reason about dependencies with respect to its plans, and we extend our definitions
accordingly. Specifically, we can define several categories of plan dependence irrespec-
tive of whether that plan is active, relevant or executing. First, we consider the situation
where the plan of one agent includes actions that are not in its capabilities so that it
relies on the capabilities of another.
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Further categories can also be defined easily. For example, reciprocal dependence
among plans describes the situation where there is a plan in the library of an agent Ah
that needs an action that can be achieved by 
A , and a plan in the library of A
 that
needs an action requiring an action of 
 .
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Clearly, the problem of dependence is most acute in a multi-agent system when
there is only one agent with the required capability causing such a dependence. This
means that an agent really does have power over another if ever the plan becomes (in
increasing degree) relevant, applicable and chosen for execution.
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In summary, an agent needs to reason with respect to events (which include the
goals of the agent) in order to make sensible judgements about its choice of plans to
execute. More precisely, it must consider the relevant plans associated with an event,
then the applicable plans, and finally the executing plans or intentions. In multi-agent
systems agents also need to reason about the dependencies of plans at all stages in order
to consider competing alternatives. In particular, if agent

depends on
?
for a relevant
plan but
?
depends on

for an executing plan, then

can be said to have more power
than
?
. Equal power occurs when two agents both have executing plans that depend on
each other. Notice that this analysis is now based on the executing plans of agents and
the models that agents have constructed about each other.
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Goal Dependence Not only may agents depend on the actions of others to achieve
their intentions, it may also be that they rely on each other to achieve their goals. This
occurs when an agent recognises that the body of a plan contains a step that is a goal
for which it cannot currently generate any relevant or applicable plans. In this situation,
the agent must either find another agent, which is sufficiently capable of generating
appropriate active plans, to adopt its goal, or recognise that another agent currently
has this goal so that the intention can be completed. (Note that we do not address the
problem of how an agent finds another to adopt its goal, but are merely concerned with
the dependence relations in this paper.) We formalise the first of these notions here
by using the predicates , .ﬂZ*+	Qﬂ and ﬂ34A*n	 ﬂ which determine whether an agent can
generate any active plans for a particular goal.
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Then we can define the notion of an agent depending on the planning capabilities
of another agent, based on the models that the first has of the second in order to achieve
some executing plan, which is part of some current intention.
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4 Norms
Now, agent societies of all kinds typically include certain constraints on behaviour that
are known as norms. Norms have been seen as a natural way of improving coordina-
tion and cooperation in multi-agent systems because they can restrict, and make more
predictable, the behaviour of agents. Researchers use different forms to represent them,
such as commitments as in [14], as mental attitudes [6], or as obligations, authorisa-
tions and conventions [8]. In addition, several different ways to reason about norms
have been proposed [4, 7, 9, 1]. Although some of the main ideas of these research ef-
forts have been taken into account in our model, we have chosen to start with our base
in order to be able to integrate our notions with the architecture described earlier. Nev-
ertheless, we agree with the basic underlying principle of the majority of such work
that norms are mental attitudes directed at controlling the behaviour of agents; that is,
norms are pro-attitudes.
Norms are simply rules in a society that must be complied with by one or more
agents. In this section, we introduce and specify some norms that are common in agent
societies, and show how they fit with the architecture described earlier. (The problems
of how to use them in reasoning of them is left for future work). Specifically, an agent
may have access to certain norms which are represented as data structures relating to
social rules. These may be common to all agents (such as with a mutually understood
social law) or only available to some. The most general structure of a norm we can
represent contains the following specific components.
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First, there is a
ﬂ34%[\64h	
, which is the goal that the relevant group of agents
must seek to achieve. Then, the ,
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of a norm refers to the set of beliefs that must
be true for the norm to be active, unless agents are in
#0
,
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states. Now, each norm
applies to a certain set of agents in the world — it may be all agents, or it may only be a
limited subset. In either case, however, the
)T)T."-#-

agents who should obey the norm
must be specified. Typically, there is also a set of "ﬂk=" , %$ agents, which are those
agents who might specifically gain from the addresses agents adopting the normative
goal. Norms may be monitored by agents referred to as T)9="
ﬂ3T)
- , who can adopt the
goal of initiating certain punishments if the norm is not complied with. Finally, it may
be that any beneficiary agent is expected to reciprocate by adopting a goal from some
pre-defined set of 
¤5T- .
In a society of autonomous agents, many kinds of norms can be found. However,
we consider only obligations and social commitments due to space constraints.
Obligations and Social Commitments Obligations may be defined as the kind of
norm which compels a group of agents to do something for another group of agents.
Generally, obligations are adopted once agents become members of a society, and per-
sist as along as they stay in the society. Their main characteristic is that agents are pun-
ished if the normative goal is not satisfied. Normative goals are satisfied either in order
to avoid punishments or just because agents have a sense of high social responsibility.
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The second category of norm is social commitments, which are norms created through
agreements or negotiations between two or more agents. Indeed, they are part of a deal
between two groups, the set of addressee agents (which could be only one) who are
obliged to achieve a goal, and the set of beneficiary agents (who sometimes also be-
come defender agents and are consequently responsible for monitoring the fulfillment
of the social commitment). Generally, once the normative goal is achieved, a reward
is claimed. In contrast to obligations, social commitments are just temporal, and may
disappear once the committed duty becomes satisfied.
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Further categories of norms, such as prohibitions, which may be defined as states
to be avoided for a group of agents, or social codes, which suggest the inclusion of
extra actions in plans, may also be defined similarly, but we will not consider them
further here due to lack of space. Now, without eliminating the possibility of having
other categories, we state that a norm can be an obligation or a social commitment.
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In general, a normative agent has all the components we have previously described
including goals, beliefs, intentions, relevant and applicable plans, models of the goals,
beliefs etc., of other agents and a set of norms which includes the obligations and com-
mitments that it has adopted.
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Social Powers The introduction of norms into this framework opens up new possibil-
ities for considering the power (and dependence) an agent may have over other agents,
not because of its sophisticated planning capabilities, but because of the social responsi-
bilities arising from norms. Thus, societies with norms can result in situations in which,
for example, more talented agents may help agents that are relatively less able. For ex-
ample, an agent in a particular society may adopt a goal to help a certain beneficiary
rather than being obliged to leave the group. In this case, the beneficiary has power over
this agent with respect to the normative goal.
We can formalise these notions in the next schema. It states that an agent has power
through an obligation over another agent with respect to a goal, if there exists some
active social obligation of the second agent in which the first is one of the beneficiaries.
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The notion of social commitment between agents also introduces power. If an agent
agrees to adopt some goal of another because of a previous agreement, then the second
agent has power through a social commitment over the first.
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Further categorisation is possible here, but space constraints dictate that only these
most important power relationships through norms can be presented.
5 Discussion
The analysis provided above seeks to show how we can move towards a unified ac-
count of social power that includes not only dependence relationships, but also other
related concepts, particularly agent architectures and the important societal concerns
of norms that will facilitate more sophisticated and effective social reasoning. Previous
work in this area has focused on these concerns, but in a discrete and somewhat arbi-
trary fashion. In this work, we seek to join the different accounts in a seamless way,
with an integrated framework that can be used to better understand and reason about
the structures that arise from the relationships in social organisations. Indeed, we are
not just integrating but also extending and filling the gaps that result from considering
these important topics independently.
For instance, our social dependence concept is slightly different from that presented
by Sichman et al. [16], mainly because the agent architecture itself is included. It allows
a clear differentiation between relevant, active and executing plans making the calcu-
lus of dependence situations more accurate. In Sichman’s work, for example, a false
dependence relationship is found if the plan causing the dependence is not selected to
achieve the considered goal. We address this problem by considering different cate-
gories of plans. In addition, in contrast to the static vision of built-in norms that must
always be complied with, our work goes in the same direction as Boello & Lesmo [1],
Dignum, Conte and Castelfranchi [8, 7] among others. That is, we consider norms as
indispensable elements to avoid chaos in any society comprising multiple autonomous
agents repsonsible for their own decisions.
Although much work regarding norms remains to be done, our initial work, in con-
trast to other proposals, includes a structure which allows different categories of norm
to be represented. In addition, a taste of power relationships based on social regulations
has been given as the first step towards an enhanced power model of relationships. In-
deed, work is already underway on exploring questions relating to the origination of
norms and relationships that give rise to power, as well as their use in reasoning about
the choice of actions and plans to execute, and agents to cooperate with.
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